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NOTES
DIVORCE AND THE ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
In many respects marriage has been likened to a partnership.
This is certainly true today in the sense that marriage involves a
rather complex group of rights and duties. It is not strange then
that the attorney for a party contemplating divorce must consider
many factors in planning the dissolution of this marital partnership
and the settlement of these rights and duties; and not to be over-
looked are the tax consequences of divorce. Perhaps the desired
results may be accomplished by a slight variation in the form, re-
sulting in a substantial tax saving to both parties or a shifting of
the tax burden from one to the other. Even if such cannot be ac-
complished, the extent of the tax burden on either party is an im-
NOTES
portant factor in considering the amount of alimony or in making
an equitable property settlement. It is the purpose of this Note
to point out the estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code which must be considered by the attorney, and to
discuss their effects.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ESTATE TAx'
The first federal estate tax was imposed by the Revenue Act
of 1916.- By section 202(b) of that Act, the value of property trans-
ferred by the decedent in contemplation of death, or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death, was
included in the decedent's gross estate unless it was "a bona fide
sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth." In 19243
Congress limited the deduction of claims against an estate to those
claims incurred or contracted for a "fair consideration in money or
money's worth," intending the test under the two sections to be the
same.' In addition, almost from its inception: the estate tax has
explicitly included in the decedent's gross estate the value of the
interest which the surviving spouse held in the decedent's property
in the nature of dower, curtesy, or their statutory equivalents.,
Common sense might therefore indicate that Congress did not
intend that the relinquishment of these property rights7 of the
surviving spouse should constitute a "fair consideration" within
the meaning of the statute. However, the courts reached the opposite
conclusion," with the incongruous result that while these property
1. Convenience of discussion requires a subdivision of the estate and
gift tax problems considered herein; but it must be remembered that, to an
extent, sharp delineation is unrealistic. Each subdivision is an integral part of
one large problem and is intelligible only when viewed in the light of the
whole picture.
2. 39 Stat. 777 (1916).
3. Revenue Act of 1924, § 303(a) (1), 43 Stat. 305 (1924).
4. H. R. Rep. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 66 (1924).
5. Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(b), 40 Stat. 1907 (1918), now Int. Rev.
Code § 811(b). The 1918 Act was said to be declaratory of its predecessor,
the Revenue Act of 1916, which made no mention of the inclusion of such
interests. H. R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1918) ; see Merrill v.
Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, 311 (1945). But see Randolph v. Craig, 267 Fed. 993
(M.D. Tenn. 1920).
6. As stated in U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.14 (1939) : "The effect of
the provisions is to require the inclusion of the full value of the property,
without deduction of the value of the interest of the surviving husband or
wife, and without regard to the time when the right to such an interest arose."
7. The term "property rights" will be used throughout this Note to be
the equivalent of dower, curtesy, or their statutory substitutes and in contrast
to the term "support rights." This terminology is consistent with that used by
the Treasury Department in E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166-169.
8. McCaughn v. Carver, 19 F. 2d 126 (3d Cir. 1927); Ferguson v.
Dickson, 300 Fed. 961 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 628 (1924) ; cf. Stub-
blefield v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 440 (Ct Cl. 1934). Contra: Mercantile
Trust Co. v. Hellmich, T. D. 3545, 111-1 Cum. Bull. 473 (1924).
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rights of the surviving spouse were includible in the decedent's gross
estate, not includible was the -value of property "transferred" in
consideration for the relinquishment of these property rights.
Similarly, a claim against the estate based upon a promise given in
consideration for relinquishment of property rights was deductible.
In 1926' Congress substituted "adequate and full consideration" for
"fair consideration," presumably intending to exclude relinquish-
ment of the surviving spouse's property rights from the definition
of consideration. 0 This intent was made explicit in 1932 when Con-
gress added that:
"For the purpose of this title, a relinquishment or promised re-
linquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created
in lieu of dower or curtesy, or of other marital rights in the
decedent's property or estate, shall not be considered to any ex-
tent a consideration 'in money or money's worth.' 11
By 1932, therefore, it was settled that transfers otherwise includible
in decedent's gross estate because, for example, intended to take
effect at death, were not to be excluded when made pursuant to an
antenuptial promise given for the relinquishment of the surviving
spouse's property rights. Similarly, claims against the decedent's
estate based upon such an agreement were not deductible.
DEDUCTIBLE CLAImS AGAINST THE ESTATE INCURRED
POSTNUPTIALLY
Where the parties after marriage have voluntarily separated
and, as incident to the separation, settle their property rights, the
courts have followed the reasoning used for antenuptial agree-
ments and have held that the relinquishment of property rights does
not constitute consideration for the settlement.12 However, where
a separation is pursuant to a decree of divorce or legal separation a
new factor is introduced, the importance of which becomes apparent
upon an examination of the statutory provisions concerned. The
Revenue Act of 1932, as well as expressly stating that relinquish-
9. Revenue Act of 1926, § 302, 44 Stat. 70-71 (1926) (inclusions in gross
estate) and § 303(a) (1), 44 Stat. 72 (1926) (deductions from gross estate).
10. "There must have been some reason for these successive changes. It
seems evident that the purpose was to narrow the class of deductible
claims .... ." Taft v. CIR, 304 U. S. 351, 356 (1938).
11. Revenue Act of 1932, § 804, 47 Stat. 280 (1932), now Int. Rev.
Code § 812(b). It seems clear that this amendment was merely declaratory
of the change made by the 1926 Revenue Act. See Empire Trust Co. v. CIR,
94 F. 2d 307 (4th Cir. 1938) (the case did have the advantage of hindsight,
being decided after the 1932 amendment).
12. Sheets v. CIR, 85 F. 2d 727 (8th Cir. 1938); Nantke v. United
States, 35 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. N.Y. 1940); see Adriance v. Higgins, 113
F. 2d 1013, 1016, 1017 (2d Cir. 1940).
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ment of the spouse's property rights is not consideration for pur-
poses of the estate tax,' 3 also revised the section of the Internal
Revenue Code defining claims against the estate which were de-
ductible, to make it clear that consideration would be required only
for claims based upon a promise or agreement. 14
Where the property rights are litigated in the divorce action
and are determined by the court, it would be difficult to argue that
a claim against the estate based upon such a decree was "founded
upon a promise or agreement" within the meaning of the statute.
Therefore, such claims need not be supported by consideration to
be deductible."' But where the spouses are content to rely solely
on their contract made in anticipation of divorce, and they make no
request of the divorce court for an order concerning their property
rights, it is equally difficult to escape the mandatory language of the
statute, and the courts have uniformly held that a claim based upon
such an agreement is not deductible. 16 These two propositions collide
where the divorce court, rather than making an independent deter-
mination, incorporates a prior agreement of the parties into the de-
cree. Is the claim against the estate founded upon a promise or agree-
ment, or is it founded upon the decree? The ramifications of this lues-
tion will be covered subsequently in a discussion of the gift tax.
However, it may be said that generally the courts have held it to be
13. See note 11 supra.
14. Revenue Act of 1932, § 805, 47 Stat. 280-281 (1932), now Int.
Rev. Code § 812(b). The Code, prior to the amendment, allowed the deduc-
tion of claims ". . . to the extent that such claims . . . were hnurred or
contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.] Revenue Act of 1926, §
303(a) (1), 44 Stat. 72 (1926). The Amendment was designed to clarify the
prior law. As stated in the report of the Committee on Ways and Means:
"The existing law might be open to a construction under which no claim
against the estate would be deductible unless supported by an 'adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth,' but the real intent
could hardly have been to deny the deduction of liabilities imposed by
law or arising out of torts, and the amendment whereby the requirement
of consideration applies only where the liability is founded on contract
is designed to clear up any doubt which may be thought to exist."
H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1932) ; see also Sen. Rep. No.
665, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 51 (1932).
15. Apparently the proposition is so readily accepted that the opposite
view has not been urged with any degree of force- In Harris v. CIR, 340
U. S. 106, 110 (1950), the Court indicated that the Commissioner acquiesces
in this position. In an earlier case the Commissioner urged the opposite view
but his contentions were rejected. See CIR v. State Street Trust Co.,
128 F. 2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942).
16. Mfeyer's Estate v. CIR, 110 F. 2d 367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
310 U. S. 651 (1939) ; William Weiser, 39 B.T.A. 1144 (1939), aff'd, 113 F.
2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940) (point not discussed) ; Estate of Eben B. Phillips,
36 B.T.A. 752 (1937).
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founded upon the decree,' z reasoning that "... since the divorce
court was free to disregard any allowances made in the separation
agreement, the allowances were authentically its own, even in cases
where it expressly accepted as proper the allowances actually
agreed upon."' 8
ANTENUPTIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE GIFT TAX
The gift tax reaches all transfers of property by gift, with cer-
tain exceptions unimportant here,' 9 regardless of the form of
transfer or the nature of the property.20 The only indicium in the
Code of what constitutes a gift is to be found in section 1002, which
states:
"Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount
by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the
consideration shall, for the purposes of the tax imposed by
this chapter, be deemed a gift .... -21
The Treasury Regulations state that the tax is not limited to the
common law concept of gifts, and a consideration not reducible
to a money value, such as love and affection or a promise of
marriage, is to be disregarded.22
Conspicuously absent is any provision as to whether or not
the relinquishment of property rights of a spouse constitutes consid-
17. CIR v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946) ; CIR v. State Street
Trust Co., 128 F. 2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942) ; Fleming v. Yoke, 53 F. Supp.
552 (N.D. W.Va.), aff'd per curiain, 145 F. 2d 472 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Estate
of Silas B. Mason, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941); Edythe C. Young, 39 B.T.A.
230 (1939). The cases of Markwell's Estate v. CIR, 112 F. 2d 253 (7th Cir.
1940), afflrming 40 B.T.A. 65 (1939), and Helvering v. United States Trust
Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 678 (1940) reach a
contrary result. However, they may be distinguished on the ground that
the fact that the agreement was incorporated into the decree was not
considered. See CIR v. State Street Trust Co., 128 F. 2d 618, 621 (1st
Cir. 1942). That this distinction may be valid is indicated by the fact that
in a subsequent case the Second Circuit grouped its prior decision in the
United States Trust case, supra, with those cases where the agreement was
not incorporated into the decree. See CIR v. Maresi, supra at 930.
18. CIR v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929, 930 (2d Cir. 1946).
19. Int. Rev. Code § 1000(a).
20. Int. Rev. Code § 1000(b).
21. Int. Rev. Code §1002.
22. U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8 (1936). This Regulation does except
bad business bargains by providing that thansfers of property ". . . made
in the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide, at
arm's length, and free from any eonative intent), will be considered as
made for an adequate and full consideration. . . ." That this exception was
not intended to apply to marital settlements even if made in the heat of divorce
litigation was settled by the Supreme Court in Harris v. CIR, 340 U. S.
106, 112 (1950). See also CIR v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F. 2d 233, 236 (2d
Cir. 1949).
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eration within the meaning of the gift tax. The question first arose
when a taxpayer and his prospective bride entered into an ante-
nuptial agreement whereby he made certain transfers to her in
return for relinquishment of her property rights. The Board of Tax
Appeals'- held that the transfers were not taxable gifts, reasoning
that since Congress specifically amended the estate tax so as to
exclude a release of property rights as "consideration," but did not
make a similar provision in the gift tax, it was intended that such
a release may constitute adequate and full consideration for gift
tax purposes.24
In the same case on appeal to the First Circuit,25 a contrary
result was reached on two grounds. First, the phrase "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth," even under the
1926 Revenue Act, excludes the relinquishment of property rights
of a spouse; the 1932 amendment to the estate tax was simply de-
claratory of the existing meaning of that phrase26 and was added
merely from an abundance of caution, and the fact that such a
qualification was not explicitly added to the gift tax is immaterial.
Second, even if the 1932 amendment of the estate tax did change
the prior law, the provisions of that amendment should be read
into the gift tax definition of "consideration," for the gift tax was,
as a principal purpose, intended to prevent evasion of the estate
tax." Since any rights a wife acquires in the taxpayer's property
in the nature of dower would be included in his gross estate at his
death, allowing an inter vivos transfer releasing those rights to
escape the gift tax would defeat that purpose. The two decisions
in this case are representative of the split in the lower courts prior
23. Bennet B. Bristol, 42 B.T.A. 263 (1940), rev'd, 121 F. 2d 129
(lst Cir. 1941).
24. Whether the value of the rights released was adequate and full con-
sideration for the transfer then becomes a question of fact. Compare Bennett
B. Bristol, supra note 23, with John D. Archibold, 42 B.T.A. 453 (1940).
25. CIR v. Bristol, 121 F. 2d 129 (1st Cir. 1941).
26. The court relied here upon Empire Trust Co. v. CIR, 94 F. 2d 307(4th Cir. 1938). See note 11 supra.
27. "In short, the design is to impose a tax which measurably ap-
proaches the estate tax which would have been payable on the donor's death
had the gifts not been made and the property given had constituted his
estate at his death. The tax will reach gifts not reached, for one reason or
another, by the estate tax.
"The gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and the income tax.
It will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution
of future income from the donated property may be to a number of persons,
with the result that the taxes imposed by the higher brackets of the income
tax law are avoided. It will also tend to discourage transfers for the purpose
of avoiding the estate tax." Sen. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40(1932) ; see also H. R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932).
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to the decision of the Supreme Court in Merrill v. Fahs s which,
in the same fact situation, adopted in its entirety the reasoning
of the First Circuit.
In CIR v. We7ntyss, 29 a companion case to Merrill v. Fahs, the
prospective bride of the taxpayer was the beneficiary of a trust,
the income of which was to be paid to her until her death or
marriages. Because she was reluctant to give up this income, the tax-
payer agreed to establish a similar trust for her benefit if she
would become his wife. The Tax Court 0 held the transfer a taxable
gift and the court of appeals 1 reversed, pointing out that a donative
intent is essential to constitute a gift, and that the detriment which
she would suffer in the loss of the trust income was adequate con-
sideration to negate such inten.,3 2 The Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals on the ground that the lack of donative intent is not
sufficient to avoid the gift tax except in the case of a transfer
in the ordinary course of business. 3 3 The tax is imposed upon those
transfers which deplete the donor's estate. 3
4
POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMIENTS AND THE GIFT TAX
Although Merrill v. Fahs left no question as to the taxation of
transfers pursuant to an antenuptial agreement under the gift
tax, considerable disagreement existed as to postnuptial settle-
ments. In Herbert Jones,3" dezided prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions in the Merrill and W'enyss cases, the Tax Court held
that a transfer pursuant to a postnuptial agreement made in anticipa-
tion of divorce was not a taxable gift. The decision was founded upon
two alternative propositions: (l) it is error to read the 1932 amend-
ment to the estate tax into the gift tax;36 (2) where the parties are
anticipating divorce, a settlement of their respective rights is
reached after bargaining at arm's length and donative intent is
28. 324 U. S. 308 (1945).
29. 324 U. S. 303 (1945).
30. William H. Wemyss, 2 T. C. 876 (1943).
31. Wemyss v. CIR, 144 F. 2d 78 (6th Cir. 1944).
32. Id. at 82.
33. "Congress chose not to require an ascertainment of what too often
is an elusive state of mind. For purposes of the gift tax it not only dispensed
with the test of 'donative intent.' It formulated a much more workable ex-
ternal test, that where 'property is transferred for less than an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth,' the excess in such money
value 'shall, for the purpose of the tax imposed by this title, be deemed a
gift. . . .'" CIR v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 306 (1945).
34. Id. at 307.
35. 1 T. C. 1207 (1943).
36. Herbert Jones, 1 T. C. 1207, 1209 (1943).
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therefore lacking.37 Both propositions were sustained thereafter in
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.38
It should be clear that the Supreme Court overruled the first
proposition by the Merrill case in holding that the 1932 amendment
to the estate tax should be read into the gift tax. Nor is the second
proposition valid since the decision in the Wemyss case, which held
that donative intent is not a proper test for purposes of the gift
tax. Encouraged by this fact, the Treasury Department promul-
gated a ruling, E.T. 19,30 which extended the theories of the
Merrill and Wemyss cases to postnuptial agreements, as stated in
this excerpt from the headnote of E.T. 19:
"Transfers of property pursuant to an agreement40 incident
to divorce or legal separation are not made for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth to the extent that
they are made in consideration of a relinquishment or promised
relinquishment of dower, curtesy, or of a statutory estate created
in lieu of dower or curtesy, or other marital rights in the trans-
feror's property or estate ......
A distinction should be drawn at this time to add clarity to later
developments. It is to be remembered that the Revenue Act of 1932
actually made two amendments to the estate tax. One amendment
defined consideration, wherever used in the estate tax, to exclude
relinquishment of property rights ;42 the other required considera-
tion for deductible claims only when the claim was founded upon
a promise or agreement.4 2 It was only the definition of considera-
tion which the Merrill case read into the gift tax, and no attempt
was made to decide when any consideration would be required.
The Tax Court refused to recognize the Merrill and Wemyss
cases as controlling in the case of postnuptial settlements, dis-
tinquishing those cases solely on the basis that they involved ante-
nuptial agreements and reverting to their argument that the parties
37. Id. at 1210.
38. See Lasker v. CIR, 138 F. 2d 989 (7th Cir. 1943).
39. E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166.
40. Although the Treasury Department limited the application of E. T.
19 to transfers "pursuant to an agreement," such is not indicative of its
acquiescense in the view that the gift tax should also contain the estate tax
provision requiring consideration for only those deductible claims founded
upon a promise or agreement. Rather, it was more in the nature of a refusal
to rule on that question. See Brief for Respondent, p. 58, Harris v. CIR, 340
U. S. 106 (1950), where the Commissioner urged that the Court not read
the limitation into the gift tax.
41. Revenue Act of 1932, § 804, 47 Stat. 280 (1932), now Int. Rev. Code§ 812(b).
42. Revenue Act of 1932, § 805, 47 Stat. 280 (1932), now Int. Rev.
Code § 812(b).
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dealt at arm's length without donative intent.4- This court failed
to recognize, at least since the Merrill and Wemyss decisions, that
lack of donative intent is not what is sought. 44 Rather, it is the con-
sideration received by the donor, and, for this purpose, the re-
linquishment of property rights by the spouse is not consideration
to any extent.
Strong disapproval has been expressed of the distinction drawn
by the Tax Court between antenuptial and postnuptial settle-
ments.45 Since the primary purpose of the gift tax was to prevent
the tax-free depletion of the donor's estate by an inter vivos trans-
fer, it has been reasoned that the significant question is whether the
transfer, if not actually made during the donor's lifetime, would
constitute a deductible claim under the estate tax .4 This, as was
seen in the discussion of the estate tax,4 7 depends upon whether the
claim was founded upon an agreement or a court decree. While
this reasoning is certainly within the spirit of the Merrill case, it
goes well beyond its holding, which merely defined the common
phrase, "c6nsideration in money or money's worth," in the same
manner as it is defined in the estate tax. What has been introduced
into the gift tax is a limitation on the requirement of consideration
which does not appear in the gift tax.4s
43. See e.g., Clarence B. Mitchell, 6 T. C. 159 (1946) ; Edmund C. Con-
verse, 5 T. C. 1014 (1945), aff'd on other grounds, 163 F. 2d 131 (2d Cir.
1947). In Edward M. McLean, 11 T. C. 543 (1948), the Tax Court expressly
held that E. T. 19 was invalid to the extent that it taxes transfers pursuant
to a postnuptial agreement made in consideration for the release of the
spouse's property rights.
44. The reasoning of the majority of the Tax Court was not without
dissent. See dissenting opinions in Norman Taurog, 11 T. C. 1016, 1022(1948); Edmund C. Converse, 5 T. C. 1014, 1016, 1019 (1945).
45. "This distinction without a difference seems to have developed
in the Tax Court which early became committed to a different view . . . and
then felt unwilling to accept what we think is the clear import of the Supreme
Court's analysis." CIR v. Barnard's Estate, 176 F. 2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1949).
46. Ibid.
47. See notes 15-18 supra and text thereto.
48. For those to whom such judicial legislation is distasteful, perhaps
the approach suggested by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Harris v.
CIR, 340 U. S. 106, 115 (1950) would be more palatable. He would hold that
a transfer pursuant to a divorce decree is not subject to the gift tax reasoning
that ". . . a gift tax is an exaction which does presuppose the voluntary
transfer of property and not a transfer in obedience to law."
One writer has suggested a constitutional basis upon which transfers
pursuant to a divorce decree must necessarily be free of the gift tax: "The
validity of the gift tax has been sustained [Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124
(1929)] on the theory that it is an excise on the transfer of property, rather
than a direct tax on the property itself, which would be void for failure of
proper apportionment. An excise taxes the exercise of a privilege; and privi-
lege, in this sense, implies alternative. State law and court order, however,
[leave] no alternative to the [taxpayer]." 41 Col. L. Rev. 1274, 1278 (1941).
It may be argued that such reasoning is hypertechnical; yet it does lend legal
[Vol. 36:918
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In Harris v. CIR,43 the first case involving a postnuptial settle-
ment to come before the Supreme Court, the Court not only
gave approval to the "agreement or decree" test as developed in the
estate tax cases but also approved its incorporation into the gift
tax. The separation agreement in the Harris case, which was in-
corporated into the decree, provided that it was not to become
effective until and unless a divorce was granted, and that it should
be submitted to the court for approval but should survive any dercee
which might be made. The Supreme Court made it clear that the
fact that the agreement was to survive the decree was unimportant,
for the statute is concerned with whether the transfer is effected
by the parties or by the court decree, and not with the means by
which the transfer may be enforced.50 The Court, however, in find-
ing that the transfer was effected by the decree rather than by the
agreement, relied on the fact that the agreement was conditioned
upon the entry of the decree.51
Whether the Court intended this to be the sole determining
factor is not clear. A subsequent decision in the Tax Court has so
interpreted the Harris case, and held that where the agreement is
incorporated into the decree, but is not conditioned in some manner
upon the entry of the decree, it is a taxable gift.52 Admittedly, if any
other circumstances are factors to be considered in determining
whether the transfer was effected by the decree or the agreement,
theory to the natural feeling that a transfer required by a divorce court
is not a proper incident for the imposition of a gift tax.
49. 340 U. S. 106 (1950).
50. Harris v. CIR, 340 U. S. 106, 111 (1950). As set forth in a footnote
in the dissenting opinion, in several states the agreement survives the decree
even though not so specified in the agreemnt. Id. at 119 n. 4. Were the Court
to rule otherwise on the effect of survival of the agreement, the taxability
of the transfer would often turn on state law, a result to be avoided to
preserve uniformity in the application of federal tax laws.
51. After pointing out that the agreement was conditioned upon entry
of the decree, the Court said: "Even the Commissioner concedes that that
result would be correct in case the property settlement was litigated in the
divorce action .... Yet without the decree there would be no enforceable,
existing agreement whether the settlement was litigated or unlitigated. Both
require the approval of the court before an obligation arises. . . In each
case it is the decree that creates the rights and the duties; and a decree is
not a 'promise or agreement' in any sense-popular or statutory." Harris v.
CIR, 340 U. S. 106, 110 (1950).
52. George G. McMurtry, 16 T. C. No. 23 (Jan. 24, 1951). The Tax
Court stated that its decision was supported by CIR v. Barnard's Estate, 176
F. 2d 233 (2d Cir. 1949). It is true that in the latter case the agreement in-
corporated into the decree was in no way conditioned upon the entry of a
decree. Upon comparing the Second Circuit's decision in that case with its
decision in Harris v. CIR, 178 F. 2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd, 340 U. S.
106 (1950), however, it appears that the underlying theory of the Second
Circuit has been that the transfer must be "founded" solely upon the decree.
This theory xvas overruled by the Supreme Court in the Harris case.
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they were not suggested in the Harris case. That the Supreme
Court may have left several "zhings unsaid is indicated by the fact
that the Court laid no stress on the fact that the agreement was in-
corporated into the decree. It is not likely that the Court would
abandon such a long established requirement without mentioning it.
In addition, the Court relied upon and approved 3 the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in CIR v. Maresi.-4 In that case, it was held that a
claim against the estate was deductible solely on the basis that it was
incorporated into the divorce decree.5 5 Regardless of whether or
not the Tax Court has erroneously interpreted the Harris case,
until the Supreme Court again considers the question it would seem
that prudence requires that the postnuptial agreement not only
be incorporated into the decree but that it be conditioned upon the
entry of the decree.
Also left in a questionable status by the Harris case is the extent
of incorporation required. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion5" pointed out that while the divorce court approved the
agreement as a whole, it ordered only certain of the transfers pro-
vided for in the agreement to be made. Yet the majority did not
remand the case for a determination of the tax on the transfer not
specifically ordered. Thus it would appear that mere approval by
the divorce court is sufficient.
Finally, there remains the problem of the extent to which the
courts will look behind the decree. It seems quite improbable that
the courts will relitigate the propriety of the amount of the award,
even though the decree merely incorporates the agreement of
the parties. No such attempt was made in the Harris case and it
would seem that, though lack of donative intent is not a proper
criterion for gift tax purposes, 7 it may be fairly assumed that the
husband gave up no more than necessary." ' The Bureau has indi-
53. Harris v. CIR, 340 U. S. 106, 110 (1950).
54. 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946).
55. That this was the sole issue upon which the court determined whether
it was a deductible claim is indicated by the following language: ".... we must
therefore here decide whether, because the decree of divorce incorporated by
reference the separation agreement, Helen G. Maresi's claim against the
estate was 'founded upon a promise or agreement. . . . At first blush the dis-
tinction [between those agreements incorporated into the decree and those
which are not] seems a little formal, but on consideration it appears to be
sound." CIR v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929, 930-931 (2d Cir. 1946).
56. Harris v. CIR, 340 U. S. 106, 119 n. 3 (1950).
57. CIR v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 308 (1945) ; see note 29 supra and text
thereto.
58. It must be granted that this assumption will not be valid in every
case. However, the additional taxes which would be derived from the excep-
tional cases would seem to be overshadowed by the large administrative
task which would be entailed.
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cated that it will not attack the jurisdictional basis of the decree."
Still unsettled, however, is the question of whether incorporation of
an agreement settling the property rights of the spouses will be
sufficient protection against gift, or estate, taxation where the
divorce court has power only to award alimony in the absence of
such an agreement.60
POSTNUPTIAL TRANSFERS INCLUDED IN THE GROSS ESTATE
Section 811 of the estate tax provided for the inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate of certain transfers 6' except those consti-
tuting a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.6 - As noted before, the disqualification of
the release of property rights of the spouse as consideration applies
to the whole of the estate tax.63 However, in the inclusion provisions
of the estate tax 4 there is no limitation which would require con-
sideration only for those transfers "founded upon a promise or
agreement," as in the provisions for deductible claims. 65 After dis-
cussing the judicial incorporation of that limitation into the gift
tax,o 6 little remains of the problem of whether it will be read into
section 811 of the estate tax for postnuptial transfers." As was true
in the gift tax, the primary purpose for the inclusion of these trans-
fers in the decedent's gross estate is to prevent the tax-free deple-
tion of the decedent's estate. It would not further this purpose to
include an inter vivos transfer made during the decedent's life
pursuant to a divorce decree where such a transfer, if not made
until after decedent's death, would constitute a deductible claim
against the estate.
59. See G. C. M. 25250, 1947-2 Cum. Bull. 32.
60. The same question would apply where the husband was awarded
alimony in a state where the wife has no obligation to support the husband.
Cf. Clarissa H. Thomson, P-H 1947 TC Mem. Dec. ff 47,194 (1947) (settle-
ment taxable).
61. See Int. Rev. Code §§ 811(c) (1) (A) (in contemplation of death),
811 (c) (1) (B) (in which the decedent has retained certain rights for his
life), 811(c) (1) (C) (intended to take effect at or after decedent's death),
811(d) (revocable transfer), and 811(f) (property with respect to which
the decedent has exercised a general power of appointment under certain
circumstances).
62. Ibid.
63. See notes 11 and 41 supra and text thereto.
64. See note 61 vspra.
65. Int. Rev. Code § 812(b) ; see note 14 supra and text thereto.
66. See notes 46-49 supra and text thereto.
67. Apparently, the only case where such a factual situation has arisen
was Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert.
denicd, 311 U. S. 678 (1940) (transfer includible). However, the problem
was not considered.
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SUPPORT OF THE WIFE AND CHILDREN
Often as important as the settlement of the property rights of
the parties, upon the dissolution of a marriage, are the provisions
made for the support and maintenance of the wife and children.
In E.T. 19,68 the Treasury Department took the position that for
both estate and gift tax purposes, a release of support rights by
the spouse may constitute a "consideration in money or money's
worth." This settled the question of whether support rights were
included within the meaning of the phrase, "other marital rights
in the decedent's property or estate," as used in section 812(b), 1 a
dispute which existed between the Board of Tax Appeals7 0 and the
Second Circuit.71 The Commissioner will review the facts of each
case to determine the reasonable value of such support rights. How-
ever, that the payments to the wife extend beyond the period of their
joint lives and, hence, beyond the period of the husband's duty to
support, does not necessarily result in a tax.72 The Commissioner
will determine whether the aggregate amount paid and payable
over the whole period exceeds the normal aggregate support rights
which would ordinarily terminate upon the husband's death.7 3
So far as the obligation of the husband to support his minor
children is concerned, the courts have unanimously agreed that
to the extent that a transfer is made, or a claim against the estate
is based, upon the assumption of the husband's duty to support
his minor children, it is supported by consideration in money or
money's worth.7 4 Whether the consideration is "adequate and full"
is determined in the same manner as in the case of the husband's
duty to support his wifeY5
68. E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166, 168.
69. See note 11 supra and text thereto setting out the section.
70. The Board of Tax Appeals held that support rights were not included
in the phrase, Estate of George Brokaw, 39 B. T. A. 783 (1939), rev'd sub
nor. Helvering v. United States Trust Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U. S. 678 (1940); Edythe C. Young, 39 B. T. A. 230 (1939)
(alternative holding).
71. The Second Circuit held that support rights were included in the
phrase. CIR v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Helvering v. United
States Trust Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 678 (1940) ;
Meyer's Estate v. CIR, 110 F. 2d .367 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S.
651 (1939).
72. E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. Bull. 166, 168.
73. For an interesting discussion of the valuation of the wife's right
to support where such rights are to terminate on remarriage, see Wolfe,
Something New in Gift and Estate Taxes, 25 Taxes 217 (1947).
74. CIR v. Weiser, 113 F. 2d 486 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Helvering v. United
States Tru't Co., 111 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 678 (1940)
Estate of Eben B. Phillips, 36 B. T. A. 752 (1937).
75. See Estate of Eben B. Phillips, 36 B. T. A. 752 (1937).
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NOTES
As was seen in the previous discussion of Harris v. CIR,7 where
a transfer or a claim against the estate is founded upon a decree
rather than a promise or agreement, there is no requirement of
consideration. It was also pointed out that in the case of the settle-
ment of property rights of the parties, the courts will probably
not collaterally attack the amount of the award for the wife, even
where the divorce court merely incorporated the agreement of the
parties into the decree.7 7 However, if the underlying reason for not
relitigating that question is that when the husband negotiates a
separation agreement in anticipation of divorce he will give up no
more than required by law, perhaps the courts will be more inclined
to look behind the provisions for the support of his minor children
and make an independent valuation of the husband's duty. Such
provisions are likely to be based upon parental love rather than
arm's length bargaining.7 8
INSURANCE PROCEEDS
It is not uncommon upon divorce to employ the use of an
insurance policy on the husband's life, as a security device or as
an outright transfer, to provide continuing payments to the wife
after the husband's death. The gift tax consequences of such a trans-
fer are not different from any other transfer of property and will
turn upon whether the transfer was pursuant to an agreement or
a decree.70 On the other hand, proceeds of an insurance policy are
included in the husband's gross estate for estate tax purposes where
such proceeds are payable (1) to the executor,80 or (2) to other
beneficiaries when the premiums are paid directly or indirectly by
the husband, or the husband, at the time of his death, possessed
any of the incidents of ownership of the policy.8 ' An exception is
made in the situation where the husband pays the premiums but has
transferred the policy in a manner not constituting a gift under the
Code. 2 The Code does not define the word "transferred," but in
effect it must mean "transferred all of the incidents of ownership,"
because if less is transferred, it will be included in the gross estate as
76. 340 U. S. 106 (1950) ; see note 49 supra and text thereto.
77. See note 49 supra and text thereto.
78. Cf. Hooker v. CIR, 174 F. 2d 863 (5th Cir. 1949), affrirming 10 T. C.
388 (1948).
79. Probably no gift tax will be imposed unless the husband has trans-
ferred all of the incidents of ownership of the policy, on the basis that the
gift is not complete. Cf. Estate of Sanford v. CIR, 308 U. S. 39 (1939).
80. Int. Rev. Code § 811 (g) (1).
81. Int. Rev. Code § 811(g) (2).
82. Int. Rev. Code § 811(g) (3).
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a policy in which the husband possesses an incident of ownership at
the time of his death. Thus, it would appear that where the hus-
band transfers the policy, including all of the incidents of owner-
ship, pursuant to an order of the divorce court, or in consideration
for the release of support rights with a value not less than the value
of the policy, the proceeds will not be included in the husband's
gross estate.
Where the policy on its face is payable to a beneficiary other
than the executor, but it is found to be merely security for an
obligation of the husband, the proceeds will be treated as though
received by the executor and will be included in the gross estate. 3
The ultimate result, however, will be the same as where the husband
made an outright transfer, as the wife's claim against the estate will
be deductible if founded upon a divorce decrees4 or the release of
support rights.
83. Estate of Silas B. Mason, 43 B. T. A. 813 (1941).
84. Ibid.
